Problems and Solutions for Broken Election Processes
Problems
and Solutions for Broken Election Processes
Date: Tue, 04 Jan 2005 11:19:45 -0600
To Concerned Citizens:
I am a professional in the area of information quality. I am very
concerned that the election processes apparently are still
severely broken even after Congress appropriated $3.86 Billion
for Election "upgrades" in 2002. The evidence is clear from
continued issues observed in the press and online discussions.
There are several things we understand in our field that are not
well understood at large or by those who have the ability to
"reform" the election processes. I would like to briefly speak to
some of these points because they are particularly relevant at
present.
Please let me share briefly some of my credentials to speak to
this matter. I have been called one of the top authorities in the
world in assessing and improving the reliability and accuracy of
information processes. My book, "Improving Data Warehouse and
Business Information Quality," was called "the Information Bible
for the Information Age" by Masaaki Imai, creator of the Kaizen
quality system, used by many world-class firms. It has been
translated into Japanese by the first information services
organization to win the Deming Prize for Quality. I was featured
on the cover of the American Society for Quality's "Quality
Progress" Jan 2000 issue, as "One of 21 Voices for the 21st
Century."
I conducted a major analysis of the 2000 Presidential Election,
"Information Quality Mandate for Election Reform," in "DM
Review," a four-part series beginning in Oct 2001. A PDF file of
the complete article is found at
http://www.infoimpact.com/newspdf/DMR_10.01IQLessonsFromElection2000-w-Links.pdf.
Problems with 2004 Electoral Information Processes:
Despite the considerable attention and concern on the part of
both the government and concerned citizens for the issue of the
reliability of electoral information processes since 2000, there
are still numerous, recurring problems that have been observed in
the 2004 election. A very small sample includes:
* Washington State has had multiple recount(s), including
belatedly discovered ballots
* 46,000 voters were discovered registered in both Florida and
New York
* 58,000 absentee ballots "disappeared" in Florida
* 38,400+ Election 2004 incident reports have been filed
according to Verifiedvoting.org
* Numerous irregularities and controversy in Ohio, including
write-in votes allegedly incorrectly defaulting to one
candidate when run through the voting machine
* Voter registration problems persist
* Provisional ballot problems, including rejection of two
thirds of Florida's provisional ballots
* Electronic voting machine malfunctions
* Electronic voting machine failures occurred this year in
Georgia, Maryland, California and other states, but the
companies that certify the machines refuse to discuss the
flaws.
Some Important, Relevant Principles:
Assuring the reliability of electronic technology is not a
mysterious art; it's an established field of practice in use by
many information professionals. As I examine these reports and
many others, it strikes me that it may be helpful to present a
few key principles that seem particularly relevant at present:
First, automating a process doesn't assure accuracy. Machines or
computer software cannot guarantee accuracy in themselves.
Assessing the accuracy of election processes requires human
observers, since only human observers comparing against a real
world entity (ballots, in this case) can play that role. Many
software applications implement "edit and validation" rules in a
way that causes errors. Furthermore, producing accurate data
requires processes and data collection devices that are clearly
defined and controlled, as well as clear guidance for the
information producers (the voters, in this case).
Second, while assuring the integrity of capture of the individual
ballots (and their count) is the central issue in any election,
assuring accurate vote capture and counts requires assessing the
reliability of the electronic voting devices and processes, not
just individual ballots. Inaccurate votes are produced by
defective processes. Not focusing on the process can lead to bias
in conclusions. For example, some of the apparent "errors" we're
hearing about may be caused by sampling error, such as an
apparent lack of random selection of districts that's been
reported for the 3% test recounts in Ohio.
Third, before use of electronic voting devices processing
election information in private, we had defined election
processes that could be audited (recounts). Apart from voter
anonymity, all steps of the process were subject to examination.
When electronic voting devices are used, they entail the need for
rigorous assessment of all components, including hardware,
software, backup and recovery, against various types of failure
(hardware, data storage, software, power outage, etc.) integrity
against tampering, chain of custody control, and ability to audit
the results for recount purposes.
My Recommendation:
My recommendation is that there should be a vigorous
investigation into the systemic and pervasive problems in the
integrity and reliability of the election processes, including
but not limited to voter registration, early voting, provisional
voting, election-day voting, vote counting, vote recount,
electronic voting, chain of custody, etc.
As an American citizen, I am very concerned about the persistent
problems.
As an expert in applying quality management principles to
information processes, I would be pleased to share my insights or
provide expert testimony to the problems, root causes, and to the
real reforms (process improvements) required to error-proof this
most- sacred privilege Americans have, to select our
representatives in government. Some requirements for real and
sustainable election reform include:
* Accessible, easy and open registration processes
* Voter-friendly ballot design (regardless of voting
technology)
* Well-defined voting processes that are error-proofed,
reliable and controlled and auditable
* Chain of custody controls to prevent tampering
* Training of election workers so they can error proof their
processes
* Training of voters (as to types of problems with the voting
devices & how to prevent errors and disqualified votes)
Thank you for allowing me to help improve one of the most
important, but one of the most broken processes in our democratic
society.
Sincerely,
Larry English, President
INFORMATION IMPACT International, Inc.
Larry.English@infoimpact.com
--
INFORMATION IMPACT International, Inc.
871 Nialta Ln., STE 100
Brentwood, TN 37027
Tel: 615-837-1211
Fax: 615-837-8804
Email:
Larry.English@infoimpact.com
Web site:
http://www.infoimpact.com
"
Improving Data Warehouse & Business Information Quality" can be
previewed on our web site.
***Plan to attend the 2005 Information Quality Conference,
September 19-23, 2005 in Houston, TX*****